Housing and Heterogeneity:
A Narrative and An Agenda


Christopher Carroll
Johns Hopkins University


"Housing, Credit, and Heterogeneity:
New Challenges for Stabilization Policies"


Riksbank, Stockholm, September 2018

Alternate History? ('History 2.0')

From 1998 We Had 2030 Tools:

2030 Data: Panel data at the household level:

  • Integrated HH balance sheets
  • With
    • Expectations ('What will [asset] prices do?')
    • Explanations ('Why'?)
    • Hypotheticals ('What would you do if?')
    • Uncertainty, Perceived Constraints ...
      • Whatever models say matters

2030 Models: Expectations Endogenized

Many competing theories right now

  • Fading Memory
  • Diagnostic Expectations
  • k-Level Thinking

Winner Will Have Two Features

  1. Expectations have an important extrapolative component
    • Perception of $\Delta p_{t} \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$

Older Similar Theories:

Winner Will Have Two Features

  1. Heterogeneity in the interval used for extrapolation
    • Shiller looks back 150 years
    • Some don't remember events from 10 years ago
      • Low-memory types: Young people, e.g.

... Toy 2030 Theory: Anatomy Of Bubbles

  1. Some genuine good news arrives
    • Causing initial $\Delta p_{t+1} > \mathbb{E}_{t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$
  1. Extrapolative $\mathbb{E}[\Delta p]$ spreads to "susceptible" like disease
    • Dies out if not enough are "susceptible"
      • People with access to funds ...
      • ... and short 'memory'
      • ... who are optimists
    • Infection $\approx$ amount marginal extra demand
  1. Bubble collapse: like "recovery" from infection

Prehistory

Mid-90's Productivity Acceleration

$\Rightarrow$ Boom in asset prices

  • Stock Market (1994-2000)
  • Also big $\uparrow$ in house prices (~1997-2002)

Housing Prices Started Rising: ~1997

Citations:

The Boom: History 1.0 - Facts

2000-01: Contra , housing was not the cycle

  • Barely a blip in house prices or construction

2001-06: "Global Savings Glut ('GSG')"

  • $\Rightarrow$ Interest rates lowest since Great Depression

  • Continuing $\uparrow$ in availability of credit across the board

    • Subprime and prime

    • Primary and nonprimary

Other Citations

The Boom: History 1.0 - Contemporaneous Views

  • First prominent claims housing bubble is inflating?
  • "That Hissing Sound"
  • 'Financial innovation'
    • 'Something funny going on around here'
  • Popular culture
    • "Flip That House" first episode: July 2005

The Boom: History 1.0 - Contemporaneous Views

"It is Not A Bubble"

  • 2005 JEP Paper

Instead, It's Improved Fundamentals

  • "New Economy", Low $R$, 'financial innovation'

Citations

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006)

  • 2030 Theory: Improved fundamentals are prereq for a bubble
    • Not an argument against a bubble
    • Bubble? Depends on "infectiousness" of $\Delta p$
      • How new marginal demand
      • Buy because of $\Delta p_{t} \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{i,t+1}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006)

  • 2030 Data: Many in "susceptible" (=marginal) pool in 2002-03
    1. Beneficiaries of 'financial innovation'
      • New people who can participate
        • (Mian and Sufi, Gramlich)
      • Others who can borrow more
        • (Adelino et al)
    2. "New Economy" beliefs + Bush tax cuts ...
      • People with money to invest ...
      • ... pessimistic about stock market (after dot-com bust)
      • ... but optimistic about house prices (extrapolating)

History 2.0 (2003/4-2006): Infection Spreading

  • 2030 Data: We see expectations and options changing heterogenously
    • Among marginal buyers, we see $\uparrow$ in $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$
      • We ask them why $\uparrow$ in $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$
        • They say, basically, "momentum"
      • and the marginal buyers say they are buying:
        • because $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p^{h}_{t+\bullet}]$
        • Many are "real estate investors"
    • Among nonbuyers we at the same time see decline in expectations
      • Dispersion of beliefs may be predictive

History 2.0 (2003/4-2006): Infection Spreading

Before 2030 Data: "You know it's a bubble" when

  • 1920s: Shoeshine boys give stock tips (Joe Kennedy)
  • 2000s: 'Flip That House': Hairdressers, bartenders become flippers

2018 Data Soo: News index gets us partway

2030 Data are the plural of anecdotes.

Boom to Bust (2007-2008): History 1.0

Competing Interpretations of Great Recession

  1. Huge negative shock to credit supply
    • Eggertson and Krugman, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, Mian and Sufi
  2. Huge increase in uncertainty
    • Bloom, many others

Boom to Bust: History 2.0 (2007-08)

  • In 2006-07, expansion of credit stops
    • Low memory marginal types extrapolate quickly:
      • Low memory former optimists become pessimists
      • $\Delta p^{h}_{2007} < \mathbb{E}_{2006}[\Delta p^{h}_{2007}]$
        • $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{2007}[\Delta p^{h}_{2008}] < \mathbb{E}_{2006}[\Delta p^{h}_{2008}]$
    • Hissing sound gets loud
    • Explains slowdown 2006-2008q2
      • Guess: Does not explain collapse between 2008q2-2008q4

Boom to Bust: History 2.0 (2008q2-2008q4)

2030 Data

  • Consumption collapsed even:
    • For people who are never going to want to borrow
    • More for people whose expectations deteriorated more
    • In regions where there had not been a boom

2030 Theory

  • Degree of uncertainty is a "fundamental"
    • We see huge increase in uncertainty
    • Those whose uncertainty increased more, cut $C$ more

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

  • Macropru regulators know how to do micro 'stress tests' <!-- * Prudence: $\mathbb{E}[u^{\prime}]$
    • At date $t$, see dist'n of balance sheets and $\mathbb{E}_{t}[\Delta p^{h}_{t+\bullet}]$
      • Can see unusual participation by marginal types -->
    • 2030 Theory: We know what circs cause defaults
      • Different for investors vs primary owners
    • Can simulate defaults under alternate future histories:
      • Productivity growth, interest rates, uncertainty
        • ,
  • By 2006, micro stress tests reveal major fragility to minor shocks
    • Vulnerability to massive departure of marginal demand
      • "Investors" as well as primary

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

Which Macropru policies do what?

  • 2030 Theory+Data: First-and-only mortgage: default when
    • Underwater + Negative income shock ('double trigger')
  • 2030 Theory
    • : Theory that matches 'double trigger' facts implies
      • Debt-To-Value rules insulate against income shocks
      • Payment-To-Income rules insulate against $p^{h}$ shocks
      • With ARMs, Debt-To-Income insures $r$ shocks (?)
    • Calibrated stress tests tell you which to adjust

Khan (2018): Macropru Effectiveness Vs Shock Kinds

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

New kinds of macropru rules

  • Countercylical rules that target "speculative" demand. Examples:
    • Risk-weighted capital rules where "riskiness" rises with
      • Proportion of aggregate lending for non-primary-residence
      • Proportion of buyers who say they are buying because $\mathbb{E}[\Delta p^{h}]$ high

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

Consequence? History 2.0 differs from 1.0

  • Size of bubble is smaller
  • For a given bubble size, consequences are milder

Part 2: Agenda

Modeling (near term priorities)

Incorporate real estate investing in HH problem

  • On top of "primary housing" choices
    • Difference: Less "utility cost" of defaulting
  • Governed by same expectations, explanations
  • In model eqbm, consumers face choice between:
    • Stock market
    • Real estate

New focus of models (and analysis thereof):

  • Tell us what to do on surveys
    • Expectations and Explanations of what?
    • Whose expectations and explanations?

Examples

  • Kaplan, Mitman, Violante (2018):
    • Expectations are central explanation of Great Recession
    • Their model: Changed beliefs about "fundamentals"
      • $\Rightarrow$ ask people beliefs about fundamentals
        • 'I think $R$ is permanently lower'? or
        • 'Prices have been going up (resp. down)'
  • Garriga and Hedlund (2018):
    • Liquidity dries up when housing market tanks
    • $\Rightarrow$ first-order precautionary effects
    • Who to target?
      • Marginal sellers in good and bad markets
      • Ask them how their behavior is affected by liquidity

Dynamics (not just steady states)

  • Especially for the marginal players
  • Sluggishness in $p^{h}$ and behavior comes from:
    • Search frictions
    • Information frictions
      • Everybody knows everything instantly: won't work
  • Very hard

Modeling Expectations and Explanations (Desiderata)

  • Ideally, same deep model for Everybody
    • Difference in deep parameter like "memory"
    • Most diffs in behavior explained by circs
  • Behavioral foundations strongly disciplined by evidence
    • "Other people are like me"
    • "Representativeness Heuristic"
    • Fading Memory
    • ...

Deep Improvements in Modeling Practice

Need a DYNARE for HA modeling

  • ECB can run Riksbank model calibrated to Italy
  • Riksbank can run Fed model calibrated to Sweden
  • Pontus can run Pavel's model; etc

Feasible with modern collaborative software development tools:

  • Modular
  • Open-source
  • Platform-Independent
  • Automatic testing/debugging tools
  • Robust reproducibility

Getting There?

  • Institutional support of infrastructure development
  • Changes in professional equilibria
    • "Publication"
      • Referees need to be able to run your code
      • Readers need to be able to reproduce your results
      • Otherwise, it's not really "public"
  • Beginning: Econ-ARK project

Abolish Consumer Expenditure Surveys

Replace them with Consumer Expectations Surveys

  • Get expenditures from admin data (Mint.com, registries)
  • Use precious survey time asking:
    • expectations
    • explanations: 'Did you buy that second house because $\uparrow$ in $\mathbb{E}_{i}[\Delta p^{h}]$?'
    • whatever else models say is important
  • Oversample potential marginal decisionmakers
    • e.g. intensive focus on new homebuyers

"2030 Data" and "2030 Theory" By 2030?

  • Depends, In Large Part, On You!
    • People in this room and people you know
  • Great Recession cost trillions of dollars
    • "2030 Data" and "2030 Theory" might have prevented it
  • Getting to "2030 Theory" and "2030 Data" - Cost
    • A few millions
  • Central Banks, IMF, Statistical agencies:
    • Seems like a no-brainer
  • Please make me a retrospective prophet!

Citations

References