Rule Content
- title: Suspicious Certutil Command
id: e011a729-98a6-4139-b5c4-bf6f6dd8239a
status: experimental
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands
like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code with
the built-in certutil utility
author: Florian Roth, juju4, keepwatch
modified: 2019/01/22
references:
- https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888102593838362624
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888071631528235010
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pki/2006/11/30/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil/
- https://www.trustedsec.com/2017/07/new-tool-release-nps_payload/
- https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: null
detection:
selection:
CommandLine:
- '* -decode *'
- '* /decode *'
- '* -decodehex *'
- '* /decodehex *'
- '* -urlcache *'
- '* /urlcache *'
- '* -verifyctl *'
- '* /verifyctl *'
- '* -encode *'
- '* /encode *'
- '*certutil* -URL*'
- '*certutil* /URL*'
- '*certutil* -ping*'
- '*certutil* /ping*'
condition: selection
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1105
- attack.s0189
- attack.g0007
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored
environment
level: high